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Abstract
There has been a large decline in the volatility of Australian output over the past
40 years. This paper looks at the causes of this decline. Accounting for part of the
change have been substantial changes in the inventories cycle. Abstracting from
changes in the inventories cycle there have also been significant declines in
underlying output volatility. This paper focuses on the underlying structural factors
for the reduction in volatility. It finds that the principal cause of the decline has
been a decline in the shocks hitting the economy rather than an increase in
structural stability. Furthermore, the primary explanation seems to lie in a
reduction in the volatility of supply or ‘productivity’ shocks. The ultimate source
of these productivity shocks is left as an open question.
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1.  Introduction
The 1990s have been a period of generally strong growth and extended expansion
throughout much of the world. In the US the expansion beginning in March 1991
has set a record as the longest post-war expansion. The expansion in Australia
from the June quarter of 1991 has also been long by historical standards. When
combined with low inflation, this robust growth has led to economic conditions
unlike any seen since the 1960s. This paper aims to shed more light on the sources
of the recent output growth experience and thereby, indirectly, on the prospects for
the future.
The most obvious feature of the recent growth experience is that output growth has
been much smoother than in previous periods. Table 1 shows the facts on output
variability over the past forty years. It shows the variance of output growth over
the four cycles that generally cover the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.1
It is clear that there has been a significant decline in GDP(E) volatility. Much of
this change in volatility can be traced to a change in the volatility of the inventories
cycle. It is not clear whether this is a statistical artefact, given that it is so large
compared to other output measures, or a real effect. To remove the influence of the
inventories cycle and focus on more fundamental forces, I will concentrate on the
growth of output minus inventories. A detailed examination of the inventories
cycle in Australia will be left for another paper.
                                          
1 The cycles are defined from trough to trough. The cycle of the ‘1960s’ is defined as 1961:Q4
to 1974:Q2, the cycle of the ‘1970s’ as 1974:Q3 to 1983:Q2, the cycle of the ‘1980s’ as
1983:Q3 to 1991:Q2 and the expansion of the ‘1990s’ by 1991:Q3 to the present, 2000:Q4.
Including the early 1990s recession in the ‘1990s’ sample, and similarly adjusting earlier
samples, does not unduly affect the results.2





Note: Calculated as the variance of quarterly GDP(E) growth, gross national expenditure plus net exports, over
the periods identified in footnote 1.
Removing the influence of inventories from the data there is still a significant
decline in output volatility. Table 2 shows the variance of domestic final demand
plus net exports.3





Note: The variances for the 1970s and 1980s are affected by one outlier in each case. Deletion of the outlier leads
to a variance of 1.31 for the 1970s and 1.16 for the 1980s. The sample periods are those identified in
footnote 1.
We can see that the volatility of output in the 1990s (abstracting from the
inventories cycle) is still the lowest it has been since the start of the quarterly
national accounts data – the volatility of the 1990s is less than half that of the
1970s or 1980s. The pattern is also slightly different, suggesting that the 1980s
were a time of relative volatility and that the 1960s, despite the picture given from
the GDP(E) data, were a time of relatively smooth expenditure growth.
The volatility of output growth is important in assessing the prospects for
economic growth. Quite apart from the confidence that smooth, consistent growth
                                          
2 The high volatility in the 1960s and 1970s is not present in the series for GDP(A). The
divergence comes from (a) the statistical discrepancy and (b) the process of chain linking the
real GDP series. These seem to lead to much greater volatility in earlier observations.
Nonetheless, the same pattern is present in the GDP(A) series. These results are presented to
provide a consistent basis for comparison with the results of Table 2. For comparison, the
variances of GDP(A) in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s are 2.41, 1.15, 0.91 and 0.35.
3 This measure is essentially GDP(E) less inventories but the use of chain-linked series creates
some minor differences in earlier periods.3
engenders, there is an effect on the potential length of expansions. With high
volatility it is much easier for random shocks to cause the economy to contract and
start a recession. The work of Hamilton (1989) seems to suggest that recessions,
once begun, have different dynamics from expansions. Thus, to the extent that
recessions are not merely a continuation of previous dynamics, their initiation is
worth avoiding.
There is also a literature that looks at the correlation between output growth and its
volatility (see Kormandi and Meguire (1985) for example). The initial finding was
that higher volatility is correlated with higher growth. This was rationalised as an
application of asset-market ideas about risk and return trade-offs; higher growth
(return) should be accompanied by higher volatility (risk). However, this has been
questioned by some more recent papers (Ramey and Ramey (1995), Martin and
Rogers (2000)). It would be interesting to see how the recent run of data, including
the substantially improved output performance in the US over the past few years,
affects this story.
These factors should provide adequate reason to look at the sources of output
volatility. Hopefully, a better understanding of their causes will allow for better
understanding of any shocks that occur and provide a better foundation for
forecasts of output growth. The rest of this paper looks at the nature of volatility in
Australian output growth and how it has changed over the past decades. It
identifies whether the reduced output volatility is primarily due to shocks or the
improved stability of the economy. The paper also considers some potential
explanations for the reduced variability of shocks. Section 2 conducts a brief
literature review to place this work in the context of previous research. Section 3
then discusses the distinction between shocks and structure in more detail.
Section 4 presents the technical details of the structural VAR model that will be
used to separate the influences of shocks and structure and Section 5 presents the
results. Section 6 speculates on causes of the decline in the supply (or productivity)
shocks identified in Section 5. Section 7 concludes. Details of the data used are
contained in Appendix A.4
2.  Literature Review
A decline in the volatility of output has been noted in a number of recent papers in
a number of countries. Gruen and Stevens (2000) note the decline in Australian
output volatility. Without conducting a detailed analysis they suggest that smaller
shocks may provide the best explanation for the recent smoothness of output
growth. Overseas studies have also focused on the reduction in output volatility.
McConnell and Quiros (2000) find compelling evidence of a structural break in US
output growth volatility in 1984.  Decomposing output to find the source of the
volatility decline, they attribute it to a change in the behaviour of durable goods
production and associated inventories behaviour. Simon (2000) also documents the
decline in volatility of US output growth and decomposes the sources using a
structural VAR methodology. This decomposition finds that the primary source of
the better performance is the reduction in the shocks hitting the economy rather
than improved structural stability. Furthermore, the primary reduction has been in
demand shocks and a much smoother profile for household consumption. The data
show that households are now behaving much more in line with the predictions of
the permanent income hypothesis and smoothing temporary income shocks much
more than they did in the 1960s.
In a related area, there was a vigorous debate within the field of economic history
about declines in US output volatility pre- and post-WWII. Results from this
research on stabilisation are equivocal. There are many technical data questions
resulting from the lack of good quality data for earlier time periods. The initial
consensus in the literature was that stabilisation, in the form of reduced economic
volatility, had occurred in the post-WWII period. This was formalised in DeLong
and Summers (1986). This view was challenged by Christina Romer in a number
of papers questioning the validity of the early data (see, for example, Romer
(1986)). This contention has, itself, been challenged by Weir (1986) and Balke and
Gordon (1989) among others.
Work on the duration dependence of business cycles attempts to understand
stability without becoming bogged down with data issues by concentrating on less
equivocal data – generally business cycle lengths. Longer expansions are seen as a
closely related consequence of lower volatility, indeed it is generally the longer
expansions that have brought the issue of lower volatility into the picture. Despite5
hopes that the analysis would not be affected to the same degree by data problems,
the findings are not clear. Diebold and Rudebusch (1990) find some evidence for
duration dependence in whole cycles since the turn of the century, but no evidence
in post-WWII expansions. Addressing the issue of post-WWII stabilisation,
Diebold and Rudebusch (1992) find that the average length of an expansion is at
least 9 months longer post-WWII than pre-WWII.
Many papers confined themselves to establishing that stabilisation has occurred;
fewer concerned themselves with explaining why this has occurred. In a paper
analysing 19
th century US data, James (1993) finds increased volatility after the US
Civil War and provides a possible reason. He finds the increased volatility was a
result of the changed structure of the economy rather than the result of an increase
in the size of shocks hitting the economy. On the basis of a structural VAR, he
attributes the increased volatility after the Civil War to the increased influence of
monetary shocks. This separation of structure (propagation mechanism) from
shocks will also be used in this paper.
The structural VAR methods that will be used in this paper are very much in the
tradition of Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Gali (1992). Similar work in the
Australian context has been conducted by Otto (1995, 1999). Otto (1995) tried to
identify the effect of terms of trade shocks on Australian output. He found that
output could be best explained by productivity shocks with other shocks having a
relatively minor effect.
3.  Structure or Shocks?
I consider two possible explanations for stabilisation. The first is that the shocks
hitting the economy have changed; the second is that the structure of the economy
has changed. The structural explanation focuses on changes in the propagation of
shocks through the economy rather than the shocks themselves. Within the
explanation based on shocks I focus on the different kinds of shocks that could
affect the economy.6
3.1  Shocks
Following on from the distinctions made in Blanchard and Watson (1986) we can
separate shocks into large, identifiable shocks and small, noise shocks. Large,
identifiable shocks include exogenous events such as the OPEC oil shocks of the
1970s as well as policy shocks such as the disinflation of the late 1980s. The
periods of focus in this paper have been chosen around the major shocks. Periods
of investigation are chosen around the four cycles that have occurred over,
approximately, the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s in Australia. The rationale for
this is the research that finds that recessions are times of accelerated
reorganisation. If there is any structural change in the economy it is most likely to
show up around recessions. Thus, the 1970s is defined by the economy’s reaction
to the OPEC I oil shock and wage breakout, the 1980s by reaction to OPEC II and
by the Accord and deregulation and the 1990s by low inflation. In line with the
findings of Blanchard and Watson (1986), that an accumulation of small shocks
does not lead to significant economic change, I assume that the economy is
relatively stable within periods.
Turning attention to smaller, within episode, shocks we can divide these on the
basis of their source. Following the seminal work of Blanchard and Quah (1989)
we can think of demand and supply shocks as the most basic shocks to hit an
economy. Simply put, supply shocks are those that have a permanent effect on
output while demand shocks are those that have no permanent effect on output. I
shall use the terms ‘supply shock’ and ‘productivity shock’ interchangeably. These
can most easily be thought of as fluctuations around some trend rate of growth
depending on how production innovations arrive and affect output.
In the context of an open economy we might also want to think about shocks to
world prices and the competitiveness of the export sector through exchange rate
changes. It is possible to conceive of these as being quite long-lived. Nonetheless,
it is hard to think of shocks that could have permanent effects as these sorts of
shocks are, at heart, just a change in prices. Thus, another sort of temporary shocks
to consider are relative export and import price changes. In this paper I will focus
on the terms of trade as the appropriate measure of these influences.7
3.2  Structure
Structure is the way given shocks propagate through the economy. Thus,
productivity shocks may have little initial effect on output, but when investment
decisions respond and embody the new technology, output may change
substantially in the medium and long run. If the pattern of the impulse response to
given shocks changes, this is an example of structural change. For example, if a
given shock causes overshooting and oscillation in one economy yet has a smooth
damped effect in another we would characterise the first as being less structurally
stable.
A more concrete example of structural change would be a change in the openness
of an economy. Changes in an economy’s trading relationships and the importance
of trade in overall GDP could have an effect on how trade-related shocks were
transmitted to the economy. One might expect that economies are now more
sensitive to movements in their terms of trade than they used to be due to the
greater international integration that has occurred in the past decades. A
countervailing influence would be the stabilisation benefits of floating exchange
rates. Until the results are generated it is difficult to guess which of these might be
more important.
To separate structure from shocks I will make use of a VAR. Estimates of the
structural VAR parameters will be used to capture the structure of the system while
the structural residuals will, clearly, be the shocks. The following section deals
with the estimation of the VAR and how I will use it to identify shocks and
structure.
4.  The Structural VAR
I use three variables in the VAR: output growth, the unemployment rate and the
terms of trade (TOT). These variables are chosen to use the same variables as
Blanchard and Quah (1989) augmented with the TOT to reflect the fact that
Australia is a much more open economy than the US. I will not be imposing any
restrictions on the model above those required to achieve identification. As such8
the details of the individual equations are relatively unimportant. The VAR
methodology specifically allows the data to suggest the best model.




These are i.i.d. shocks to supply (productivity), demand and the TOT. ε
s is a
productivity shock that may have permanent effects on output while ε
d is a demand
shock that is constrained to have no long-run effect on output. ε
TOT is a shock to
the level of the TOT which is also constrained to have no long-run effect on
output.
The exact variables used (i.e. whether in levels or differences) are discussed in the
next section. For the time being I will just describe the relation between output,
unemployment and the terms of trade. Suppose that the relation between
) , , ( ′ = TOT ue y x  can be characterised by the structural equations:
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and Bs is a general (3x3) matrix. This can be rewritten in more standard VAR form
























Identification of the structural parameters requires identification of the parameters
of B0. Given knowledge of B0 the remaining Bs can be identified from the reduced
form VAR parameters. There are six free parameters in B0 so six restrictions are
needed to identify them. The first three restrictions come from assuming that the
underlying shocks are mutually orthogonal and, thus, that their covariances are
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and we require that ΩΩΩΩ ij=0 for  j i ≠ . A consistent estimate of ΣΣΣΣ  is obtained from the
reduced form VAR residuals.
The remaining three restrictions are generated from economic argument in the
manner of Blanchard and Quah (1989). The first two are that demand shocks and
terms of trade shocks have no long-run effect on the level or growth rate of output.
The long-run restrictions are now widely used but still controversial. Much of the
justification for their use has already been given previously (see, for example,
Blanchard and Quah (1989)). Notwithstanding this, I present some reasons why
terms of trade and demand shocks may not have any long-run effect on output. As
argued in Blanchard and Quah (1989) there may be reasons to think that demand
shocks can have long-run effects on output. However, the size of these effects is
likely to be very small compared to that of supply disturbances. As such, the
identification that demand shocks have no long-run effects is ‘almost correct’.10
It is possible to imagine two forces driving the terms of trade: long-term structural
changes in the composition of imports and exports and fluctuations in the prices of
a relatively stable basket of imports and exports. In the latter case there should be
no significant long-run effect on output. In the former case you might well expect
these changes to affect output. However, in these cases the shocks are more
reflective of output and demand changes than terms of trade fluctuations. These
shocks will appear in the terms of trade but are probably better identified with
domestic factors such as demand or supply. The identification strategy used
explicitly rules out long-run effect from the terms of trade and thereby focuses on
the short to medium-term price fluctuations in the terms of trade. The longer-term
changes are associated with supply shocks. I will return to this consideration when
the final results are interpreted. Notwithstanding this, it is possible to change the
identifying assumptions and relax the assumption that terms of trade shocks have
no long-run effect. This is done at the end of the section.
The long-run restrictions are implemented as follows:
It is possible to write the reduced form VAR in MA(∞ ) form
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If x
i is included in the VAR in differences then the long-run effect of a shock in εεεε
j
on the level of x










where  I Ψ = 0 .4 Thus, the two long-run restrictions are imposed as:
                                          
4 This will be the case in the implementation of this paper. In the event that the variables were




























In practice, we can use the VAR representation to impose the long-run restriction.
If, for example, we have estimated a VAR(3) model, the long-run cumulative
effect of an innovation in ut on xt is given by  1
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The remaining restriction imposed is that the terms of trade has no
contemporaneous effect on unemployment. This captures the fact that there are
lags in the effect of the terms of trade on the economy. This is the simplest to
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Thus, these restrictions guarantee identification of the structural model from the
reduced form estimation.
The robustness of these results was tested by varying the set of restrictions among
a wider set of alternatives. The results are relatively insensitive to the particular
restrictions chosen. When alternative contemporaneous restrictions are imposed the
results are generally the same. Restricting the TOT to have no contemporaneous
                                          
5 See Hamilton (1994, p 20) for the presentation of the univariate case. The vector case is a
simple generalisation of this.
6 It makes no difference whether the variable is expressed in levels or differences for this
restriction.12
effect on output or restricting the TOT to have no contemporaneous response to
productivity or demand shocks did not alter the results. Furthermore, there was
little change in the results from allowing the TOT to have some long-run effect on
output.7 In this case the estimated long-run effect on output was very close to zero.
This suggests that long-run changes in the composition of imports and exports that
would have long-run effects on the terms of trade and output are better captured by
the model as supply shocks than terms of trade shocks.
4.1  Separating Structure and Shocks
Identifying whether the reduction in output volatility is due to the structure of the
economy or the shocks hitting it is a central objective of this paper. This section
outlines the strategy that will be used to make this identification.
Following the discussion in Section 3, structural change is identified as a change in
the coefficients of the structural VAR while a change in shocks is a change in the
variance of the structural errors. Thus, changes in ΩΩΩΩ  are changes in shocks and
changes in B0,…,Bp are structural changes or, more correctly, changes in the
propagation mechanism.
For example, volatility in output could emerge due to an increase in the size of
demand shocks or through a change in the propagation of those same demand
shocks through the economy. In practice many changes are occurring at once.
Policy rules change as well as interest rate shocks. Demand shocks change at the
same time as supply shocks. The propagation of demand shocks through the
economy, perhaps through greater economic integration, may be more or less
damped.
Structurally similar models (those with similar parameters B0,…,Bp) should react
similarly to given shocks while there should be a different response when the same
shocks are applied to structurally dissimilar models. A useful metric for evaluating
the volatility of a model is the forecast error variance (FEV) of output at some
                                          
7 To ensure identification, another contemporaneous restriction on the TOT or unemployment
is used instead. For example, one set tested consisted of the restrictions: demand shocks have
no long-run effect on output, the terms of trade shock has no contemporaneous effect on
unemployment and the terms of trade shock has no contemporaneous effect on output.13
given horizon. In the tables below I will consider separately the effect of the
structure on the FEV and the size of the structural shocks. The second is easy to
see as it is just given by the matrix ΩΩΩΩ . Thus, we can see what has happened to the
individual shocks, whether their variance has risen or fallen. The first is slightly
more complicated. Nonetheless, identifying the effect of the structure on the FEV
requires only a simple modification of the information contained in standard
variance decompositions.
The formula for the contribution of the j
th orthogonalised innovation to the mean
squared error (MSE) of the s-period forecast is:
] [ ) ( 1 1 1 1 − − ′ ′ + + ′ ′ + ′ ⋅ s j j s j j j j jt Var Ψ a a Ψ Ψ a a Ψ a a  ε (11)
where aj is the j
th column of the matrix 
1
0
− = B A  and Var(ε
jt) is the variance of the
j
th structural shock. In a variance decomposition this is normally divided by the
total MSE to give the relative contribution of each orthogonal component. Instead I
will focus on the portion in brackets – the structural part. I look at the relative
sensitivity of each model to a unit variance structural shock.8 Of themselves these
responses are not informative, however, by looking at them relative to other
periods we can see whether one model is more or less sensitive to particular
shocks. Thus, if a given shock in one model leads to a higher overall MSE then we
would say that that model is more sensitive to that particular structural shock. If a
particular structure is more sensitive to all shocks we can clearly say that it is a less
stable structure. Unfortunately, we are unlikely to get a complete ordering of
structures on the basis of this observation. What we will get, however, is an
indication of which shocks a particular period is most sensitive to.
If a more complete ranking is desired a natural one to consider is given by the
following procedure. Consider subjecting one system to the shocks from another
system. If the overall FEV is higher in the second system we might conclude that it
is less resilient to the kind of shocks that occur in the first system. This uses the
relative variances of shocks as the method of weighting the model sensitivities.
While still arbitrary, this method provides an easily interpretable result.
                                          
8 Although any size would do, as all that is necessary is that  ) ( jt Var ε be equal for all the
structures being evaluated.14
Specifically, it can tell how well the 1990s, say, would have reacted to the shocks
experienced in the 1970s. If the overall FEV is lower in the 1990s when subjected
to the shocks of the 1970s we would say that the 1990s were a more stable system.
5.  Data and Results
Before presenting the main results I consider the appropriate way to include the
variables in the VAR. This decision is driven by the results of ADF tests presented
in Table A1 in the appendix. Output is unquestionably non-stationary while its
growth rate is stationary so it is included in the VAR in growth rates. The evidence
for unemployment and the terms of trade is more mixed. Over some samples they
appear stationary and over others it is not possible to reject the null of integration.
As there is not much to be gained one way or the other I include these variables in
levels. Ultimately, the choice does not have a strong effect on the results.
The table below shows the variances of the structural shocks across the four
samples considered in this paper. Clearly the shocks were much smaller in the
1990s than in any other period.
Table 3: Structural Variances
  Productivity Demand   TOT
1960s 1.36 0.027 26.96
1970s 0.81 0.045 3.84
1980s 1.24 0.079 4.80
1990s 0.70 0.024 1.50
It is worth reminding the reader at this point that the ‘1970s’ in this table applies to
the expansion from 1974:Q3 to 1983:Q2. Thus, the first OPEC oil shock actually
falls right at the end of the ‘1960s’ sample. This is part of the explanation for the
relatively low TOT structural variance in the ‘1970s’ and the high variance in the
‘1960s’.9 With regard to the interpretation of the structural variance of the
                                          
9 The other part of the explanation is that quarter-to-quarter volatility in the 1960s was very
high whereas the quarter-to-quarter volatility was less in the 1970s despite the overall range
for the TOT being larger in the 1970s. These variances are residuals from an estimation and
so do not necessarily match standard deviations of the series over the various samples.15
productivity shocks this is not as much of an issue. Output was highly volatile in
the 1960s even in the absence of any effect from the large OPEC oil shock. Table 4
below presents the sensitivity of each system to the different structural shocks at a
horizon of one year. The results are all normalised so that the sensitivity of the
1990s equals one and so cannot be directly compared across columns.
Table 4: Sensitivity to Structural Shocks
Productivity    Demand     TOT
1960s 0.84 1.35 0.06
1970s 1.27 2.40 0.45
1980s 1.12 1.56 0.42
1990s 1.00 1.00 1.00
Note: The numbers are the sensitivity term identified in Equation (11) normalised by the sensitivity of the 1990s.
The numbers represent the sensitivity to each kind of shock at a horizon of four quarters. The samples are
those identified in footnote 1.
We see that the 1990s were more sensitive to TOT shocks than in previous periods
while there has been a reduction in the sensitivity to demand shocks. Nonetheless,
the changes in sensitivity to demand and TOT shocks are significantly smaller than
the changes in the structural variances.
The finding that output growth is more sensitive to TOT shocks in the 1990s is, at
first glance, counterintuitive. Standard international economics theory suggests that
a floating exchange rate should insulate the economy from TOT shocks more than
a fixed-rate regime. We might then expect that output would be less responsive to
TOT shocks in the 1990s. Unfortunately it is difficult to make a direct connection
between the theory and the empirical results here. Part of the difference stems from
the fact that appropriate dynamic responses are not well understood in these
circumstances. Furthermore, the results reported above are for output growth rather
than the level of output which is what is commonly included in the theory. Looking
at the results for the level of output suggests that there has been little change in the
sensitivity of output to TOT shocks. This may suggest that the moving peg that
prevailed before the float of the dollar may have provided the same level of
insulation as the float. This is, however, moving a little far from the focus of this
paper and I will leave further investigation to other work.16
The decline in the sensitivity of the economy to demand shocks provides some
evidence that structural changes have helped reduce the volatility of output.
Specifically, the economy is now somewhat more resistant to temporary shocks.
The particular structural changes may include the microeconomic reform of the
1980s as well as the introduction of the medium-term inflation target in the 1990s.
Overall, however, Tables 3 and 4 suggest that the primary reason for the decline in
output volatility in the 1990s was a decline in the volatility of the underlying
shocks. The final piece of information required is to look at a variance
decomposition to see which shocks are the most important in explaining overall
output variability. Table 5 shows this decomposition at a one year horizon. Results
are similar for longer horizons.
Table 5: Variance Decomposition of Output Growth
Productivity Demand TOT
1960s 83 5 12
1970s 72 15 13
1980s 75 13 11
1990s 78 5 17
Note: Numbers represent the percentage of forecast error variance that can be attributed to each kind of structural
shock at a horizon of one year. Samples are those identified in footnote 1.
The dominance of productivity shocks in all periods leads to the strong conclusion
that the decline in the volatility of productivity shocks was the most important
single factor in the decline in output volatility in Australia in the 1990s. More
precisely, given the identification strategy, the decline in the volatility of
permanent shocks is the most important single factor explaining the decline in
output volatility in Australia – and these permanent shocks are best thought of as
productivity shocks. Demand and TOT shocks are relatively insignificant.
Nonetheless, they both have parts to play in the decline.
The increased sensitivity of the 1990s to TOT shocks shows up in a larger
contribution to the forecast error variance (FEV) for TOT shocks despite the lower
variance of TOT shocks during the 1990s. This suggests that an important area to
watch in terms of output volatility is the terms of trade. Relatively minor
fluctuations in the TOT (from a historical perspective) could have a significant
effect on output volatility. For example, volatility in the TOT similar to that of the17
1980s could raise the volatility of output by almost 50 per cent.10 The reduction in
demand shocks’ weight in the variance decomposition is a reflection that demand
shocks and the structural sensitivity of the economy to demand shocks have
reduced by significantly more than the average.
These results are broadly in line with previous work on Australia by Glenn
Otto (1995, 1999). He found that TOT shocks were relatively insignificant and that
productivity shocks explained much of the forecast error variance in his models.
Nonetheless, it is interesting to see that the predominant influence on Australian
output volatility comes from the shocks hitting the economy rather than the
structural responses to those shocks.
Thinking about the various shocks identified raises some substantial questions.
While it is fairly easy to identify causes of fluctuations in Australia’s terms of
trade, it is more difficult to think about causes of fluctuations in productivity. The
next section speculates on possible interpretations of the results.
6.  The Source of the Volatility
The facts detailed in this paper fall into a much larger worldwide picture. In most
industrialised countries the volatility of output growth has been falling fairly
consistently.11 The figure below shows this pattern in the US, UK, Canada and
Australia by way of illustration.12 This suggests that there is a common force
affecting industrialised nations or, perhaps additionally, that the observed patterns
have an overseas source. In the case that there is a common force affecting nations
it is unsurprising that TOT shocks have a limited role in Australia. Other countries
have experienced a similar decline in output volatility despite widely varying
sensitivity to TOT shocks.
                                          
10 This is calculated by looking at the FEV of output one year out if the economy was subjected
to productivity and demand shocks of the same size as in the 1990s but TOT shocks from the
1980s.
11 See Blanchard and Simon (2001) for a discussion of the G7.
12 The line for Australia is based on GDP rather than the series used in this paper to ease the
comparison across countries, hence, the data broadly match those mentioned in footnote 2.18
Figure 1: Output Volatility


















Panel data regressions run by Blanchard and Simon (2001) on the G7 minus Japan
reveal that output volatility is well characterised by a steady downward trend that
is interrupted in the 1970s and 1980s when inflation volatility was high. That is, a
regression with a time trend and inflation volatility provides a good fit for output
growth volatility in the G7 less Japan. Interestingly, the level of inflation is not
found to be significant while the volatility of inflation is highly significant. This
fact suggests that inflation volatility is capturing the effect of general uncertainty
rather than an effect specifically related to the rate of inflation.
These additional findings suggest the following explanation for the specific results
found in this paper. Temporary demand shocks had a larger role in explaining
output volatility in the 1970s and 1980s when inflation volatility was also higher
(see Table 5). This coincidence suggests that the demand shocks identified in
Australia are related to economic uncertainty of the sort associated with high and
variable inflation. With inflation having been brought under control, this particular
source of shocks makes very little contribution to overall volatility in the 1990s.
This also suggests that monetary policy may play a useful role in the reduction of19
general economic uncertainty and thereby achieve simultaneous reductions in
output and inflation volatility. Previous theoretical research has suggested that
monetary policy may involve a trade-off between the two. However, the
simultaneous reduction in output and inflation volatility is a robust characteristic of
the data. It is hoped that further research can reconcile the theoretical and empirical
findings.
The supply or productivity shocks seem more closely linked with the trend
component of the decline in output volatility. The causes of the trend decline
worldwide have yet to be identified but several suspects present themselves.
General structural change in output towards services production, which is generally
smoother, can explain some, but certainly not all, of the pattern. A potentially
larger force is the effect of this trend on individual incomes in combination with
the increased skill of the workforce. In addition to moving towards services
production, the workforces of the industrialised world have become more highly
skilled over the past decades. Australia has been no exception. Skilled workers
generally experience smoother income paths than unskilled workers. They also
have better employment prospects in the event that they lose their current job.
Thus, a general compositional shift towards more skilled workers in combination
with a shift towards services may result in a smoother overall profile for earnings,
employment, consumption and, finally, output. The verification of this hypothesis
requires the analysis of micro data on individual earnings. This is the next natural
step in this research program.
An additional suspect is the increased financial sophistication and development
that has occurred around the world over the past decades. A greater ability of
consumers to borrow and smooth their consumption could have a large effect on
the overall volatility of demand and, consequently, total output. One specific
manifestation of this would be a reduction in the number of credit-constrained
consumers. Research on the permanent income hypothesis and consumption
smoothing has found some support for the idea that less consumers are
credit-constrained now than in the past. One beneficial consequence of this
financial development could then be reduced output volatility.
Finally, a comment on the low contribution of the terms of trade to overall output
volatility. If the Australian pattern of output, and in particular exports, is moving20
towards products whose output is less volatile this could show up in either the
terms of trade or the productivity shocks. By making the identification assumption
that the terms of trade shocks have no long-term effects the sustained shifts in the
pattern of production and trade would be excluded. Thus, the terms of trade shocks
may capture those shocks to the pattern of production that are separate from the
general, and permanent, trend towards less volatile products. Given the large
presumed size of the trend in production this could lead to most of the shocks
being identified as productivity rather than terms of trade shocks. Furthermore,
given that the shocks are very much a product of domestic changes they should not
necessarily be identified with terms of trade shocks. Only if Australian domestic
production remained in volatile industries while our exports shifted towards
smoother industries would these effects be identified with terms of trade shocks.
7.  Conclusion
Australia’s output growth has shown a marked smoothing in the 1990s compared
to previous decades. Part of this smoothing can be attributed to a moderation of the
inventories cycle. Nonetheless, after removing the inventories cycle from the data a
significant smoothing remains. The source of this smoothing was traced to a
reduction in the volatility of productivity shocks. Importantly there does not seem
to be a significant role for changes in the propagation mechanism.
The relative influence of shocks found in this paper is in line with previous
Australian findings. Otto (1995), in a study that did not look for structural changes,
found that terms of trade shocks were relatively insignificant in explaining output
volatility and that productivity shocks were the primary factor.
The finding that the reason for reduced volatility is not changes in the structure of
the economy is also similar to the findings on the US economy in Simon (2000).
Nonetheless, there are some contrasts to the results from the US. There, the prime
cause of the fall in volatility is found to be in demand shocks. Nonetheless,
productivity shocks also play some role in the observed decline in US volatility,
just as demand shocks play a role in Australia. The difference is in the relative
importance of the shocks in the two countries; productivity and demand shocks21
both declined in the 1990s in the two countries. As such the findings are more
easily reconciled.
There is also evidence from the US that inventories have some part to play in the
reduction of overall volatility. Nonetheless, it is not clear whether inventories are a
causal factor or are merely responding to lower volatility in other areas of the
economy. Hopefully, future research will clarify this question.
More practically, the results suggest that terms of trade shocks can have a much
greater effect on output volatility than in the past. Furthermore, future research is
needed to identify the nature of productivity shocks hitting Australia to provide a
basis for more confident forecasts and understanding of future output fluctuations.
Section 6 provides some speculation as to potential explanations for the findings so
far. If the primary cause of the reduction in output volatility is the combination of
sectoral shifts and changing skills of the workforce we should expect that output
volatility will continue to remain low in the future. Continued low output volatility
should enhance the prospect that the business cycle will be milder than in earlier
periods. Similarly, provided there is no deterioration in the financial system, it
seems likely that consumers’ ability to smooth their consumption should remain. It
is hoped that further research can answer the questions raised in this paper and
confirm (or refute) the ideas of Section 6.22
Appendix A: Data
The data used are quarterly domestic final demand plus net exports, the
unemployment rate, and the terms of trade on goods and services. The output data
are measured in constant chain-linked prices while the terms of trade is an index
and the unemployment rate is in percentage points. The unemployment rate for a
quarter is calculated as the average of the three monthly observations in that
quarter. While it is not strictly necessary for the correct estimation of the VAR that
the variables be stationary it is useful to have an idea of their general properties.
The following table presents the results from ADF tests on the order of integration
of the variables across the samples used and across the entire sample period. y is
the log of output and ∆ y is the change in the log.
Table A1: ADF Test Statistics
Full sample 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s



































Notes: The tests are conducted by regressing the variable (x) on its own lag (x
t1 ), a time trend and constant, and
enough lags of ∆ x to remove autocorrelation. The statistics reported are  σ ρ / ) 1 ( −  where ρ  is the
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable and σ  is the standard deviation of the estimate. Critical values
are found in Table B.6 in the back of Hamilton (1994).
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
So we see that while output growth is unquestionably stationary the unemployment
rate and terms of trade seem non-stationary. Indeed, if we took these results at face
value, it suggests that unemployment is I(2) in the seventies and eighties and the
terms of trade is I(2) in the eighties. This is sufficiently beyond the realms of
possibility that I discount these findings. The results for unemployment and the
terms of trade are most likely a result of the small sample sizes involved in these
decade long samples and the low overall power of the tests. Over samples
including the 1960s and 1970s, and 1980s and 1990s the terms of trade is found to
be stationary, however, it is still not possible to reject the null of integration for
unemployment. I appeal to common sense to argue that the terms of trade and23
unemployment rate, while persistent, are unlikely to be integrated. The terms of
trade should be stationary if even a weak form of purchasing power parity holds
while the unemployment rate is bounded by definition. As such, I include them in
the VAR in levels rather than differences. There is little change in the results if the
change in the unemployment rate is included instead of the level, however, results
change more if the change in the terms of trade is used.24
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